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Introduction
For over 150 years, India has engaged in arbitration following the
introduction of the Civil Procedure Code of 1859 which came into
effect with its chapter on arbitration. However, the concept of international commercial arbitration (“ICA”) was then unknown. ICA first
assumed significance in India due to the globalization and liberalization
of the economy—the resulting phenomenal growth of commerce and
industry—of the late twentieth century. Indeed, the Arbitration Act of
1940, which governed the field for nearly half a century, did not include
provisions for ICA. The Act of 1940 was then replaced by a new legislation in 1996, with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The Arbitration
and Conciliation Act of 1996 has subsequently been enacted with the
hope of giving a new face to arbitration so that it does not replicate
the civil courts, which suffer from the huge backlog of cases. Since the
enactment of the present legislation, there has been a rise in ICA in the
country. With the opening of foreign direct investment, the Indian legal
system has been increasingly gaining momentum in ICA proceedings.
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Besides being a major investment destination, there has also been a visible trend of greater participation by India in the global economy.
Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996—mirrowing
the jurisprudence fo the UNCITRAL Model Law (Model Law)—makes
detailed provisions relating to both domestic arbitration and international commercial arbitration. The law makes it clear that “notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in
matters relating to all kinds of arbitration in India, no judicial authority
shall intervene except as provided in the Act itself.”2 But, paradoxically
in any arbitral system, public courts may play a major role at various
stages of a dispute: before the arbitration, during the arbitration, and
even after an award has been rendered. Therefore, an absolute alienation
of arbitration from the national courts is almost impossible. This is very
much evident from the statistics of pre- and post-arbitration litigation
brought before Indian courts. As such, certain questions relating to
the conflict of laws, especially the issue of supervisory, or supportive,
jurisdiction in international arbitration have become subjects of intense
judicial debate.
I. The Nature of the Problem
Since the ratification of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996
(“the Act”), many provisions have been the subject of constant judicial disagreement. The actual difficulty originated from the reading of
Section 2 (2),3 which outlines the scope of applicability of Part I of the
Act. Judges have supplied unusual interpretations due to a deficiency in
the definition of the scope. The conflicting views were about the application of Part I with respect to ICA in instances where the place of arbitration is outside India.4 This conflict existed in various high courts in
See The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, No. 26 of 1996, India Code § 5 (1996),
available at http://indiacode.nic.in.
3
See id. at §2 (stating that “this Part shall apply where the place of arbitration is in
India.”).
4
See, e.g., Marriott International Inc. v. Ansal Hotels Ltd., A.I.R. 2000 Del. 377
(DB) (endorsing the view that Part I of the Act would apply only to arbitrations where
the place of arbitration is in India); Dominant Offset Pvt. Ltd. v. Adamouske Strojirny
AS, (1997) 68 D.L.T. 157 (Delhi) (holding that the provision does not exclude the
applicability of Part I to those arbitrations which are not being held in India); Olex
Focas Pvt. Ltd. v. Skodaexport Company Ltd., AIR 2000 Del.161 (Delhi). But see
East Coast Shipping v. M.J Scrap, (1997) 1 Cal HN 444 (holding that Part I of the Act
would apply only to arbitrations held in India).
2
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India until the Supreme Court intervened with their decision in Bhatia
International v. Bulk Trading SA.5 Therein, the Court held that, “Part
I of the Act would also apply to international commercial arbitrations
held outside India, unless the parties by agreement, express or implied,
excluded all or any of its provisions.”6 However, the Supreme Court’s
interpretation went against the mandatory language of Section 2(2) of
the Act. The reasoning of the court, inter alia, included the view that
the omission of the word ‘only’ makes Part I applicable to arbitrations
seated in a foreign territory, which clearly deviated from the corresponding Model Law provision.7 This statement of law by the Supreme
Court has resulted in Indian courts taking an unconventional path with
respect to the supervisory jurisdiction in cases of international arbitration. Moreover, the decision has raised several concerns among the
international trading community, raising an impression of Indian hostility toward international commercial arbitration.
A. The Principle of Implied Exclusion
The post-Bhatia decisions dealt with the doctrine of ‘implied exclusion’ exploring different criteria to determine the applicability of the
Act with respect to the supervisory role of national courts in foreign
seated arbitrations. Generally, the courts were reluctant to hold that Part
I of the Act was inapplicable even when the seat was outside India or
where the substantive law of contract was foreign law.8 However, in a number of cases, the courts took a pro-arbitration stance and held that “the parties had
impliedly excluded the jurisdiction of Indian courts and the application
of Part I of the Act.”9 Although the courts could not arrive at a fixed
formula to apply the implied exclusion principle afforded by Bhatia,
the courts never relied on the ‘selection of a foreign seat’ as a reference point, to prevent the overreach of Indian judiciary in an offshore
arbitration.

(2002) 4 SCC 105.
Id.
7
See Art. 1(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law: “The provisions of this Law, except
articles 8, 9, 17, 32, and 36, apply only if the place of arbitration is in the territory of
the State.”
8
See Citation Info Wares Ltd. v. Equinox Corporation, (2009) 7 SCC 220; see also
INDTEL Technical Services v. W S Atkins Pvt Ltd (2008) 10 SCC 308.
9
See, e.g., Max India Ltd v. General Binding Corporation, 2009 (3) Arb LR 162
(Delhi).
5
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There have been certain instances in the post-Bhatia era where courts
were willing to accept the argument that the parties had opted out of the
application of the Act. However, in these instances, courts have applied
varying criteria. For example, in Hardy Oil and Gas Ltd. v. Hindustan
Oil Exploration Co. Ltd.,10 Indian law and English law governed the
main contract and arbitration agreement respectively. In this case, the
arbitration was to be conducted according to the rules of the London
Court of International Arbitration in England. The Gujarat High Court
held that Part I was to be impliedly excluded because the parties had
expressly chosen English law as the curial law of arbitration. Later, the
Supreme Court came close to accepting the well-established seat theory
of international arbitration11 in Dozco India v. Doosan Infracore Co.
Ltd.12 However, it missed the opportunity in clearing up the anomalous
situation. In the case of Videocon Industries Ltd. v. Union of India,13
the agreement provided for Indian law to be the proper law of contract
and English law as the law of arbitration. The Court held that, by virtue of English law being the curial law, Part I was excluded. In Yograj
Infrastructure Ltd. v. Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Ltd,14
the agreement provided for the rules of the Singapore International
Arbitration Centre as the procedural soft law for arbitration seated in
Singapore. The Court held that Part I was excluded even though the parties had expressly stated that the substantive law of the contract would
be Indian law. However, the confusion caused by the Bhatia decision
was exacerbated and resulted in labelling India as an anti-arbitration
jurisdiction when the Supreme Court annulled a foreign award in its
decision Venture Global Engineering v. Satyam Computer Services

10

Hardy Oil and Gas Ltd. v. Hindustan Oil Exploration Co., (2006) I.L.R (Guj.)

658.
See also FA Mann, ‘Lex Facit Arbitrum’ in International Arbitration – Liber
Amicorum for Martin Domke, P. Sanders (ed.) (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1967).
12
M/S Dozco India P. Ltd. v. M/S Doosan Infracore Co. (2011) 6 S.C.C. 179 (India)
(holding that “[i]n the absence of express agreement, there is a strong prima facie
presumption that the parties intend the curial law to be the law of the ‘seat’ of the
arbitration on the ground that, it is that country, which is most closely connected with
the proceedings”) (citing Michael Mustill & Stewart Boyd, The Law and Practice of
Commercial Arbitration in England (2nd ed. 1989)).
13
Videocon Indus. v. Union of India, (2011) 6 S.C.C. 161 (India).
14
Yograj Infrastrusture Ltd. v. Ssangyong Eng’g & Constrr. Ltd., (2011) 9 S.C.C.
735 (India).
11
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Ltd.15 Pursuant Venture Global, an Indian court could hear challenges to
a foreign arbitration award under Section 34 of Part I of the Act.
II. Judicial Treatment for the Ailment
On January 10, 2012, a five judge constitution bench of the Supreme
Court started its proceedings in the case of Bharat Aluminium Co. v.
Kaiser Aluminium Technical Service Inc. (hereinafter BALCO).16 The
Court reconsidered the controversial rulings in Bhatia and Venture
Global pertaining to the scope of extra territorial application of Part I
of the Act.17 The Court affirmed that the Act adopted the territoriality
principle of the Model Law and accepted existing theories in international arbitration on Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention (“the
NY Convention”).18 The case involved several appeals dealing with
the same, broader legal issue: whether the Indian courts can perform
supervisory jurisdiction in arbitrations seated outside the country. The
Supreme Court of India gave the answer in the negative. Essentially,
the decision meant that the Indian courts could no longer make interim
orders, remove or appoint arbitrators in arbitrations with seats outside or
entertain annulment challenges to foreign arbitration awards.19 The following sections address certain pertinent issues relating to this broader
legal question.
A. Silence and the Implication of License
The Court in BALCO deliberated in detail upon the significance of
the missing word “only” in section 2(2). The word “only” would not
have been significant had it not been used in Article 1(2) of the Model
Law. The senior counsel for appellants contended that, since “only” is
absent from the provision, the applicability of the Act is automatically
Venture Global Eng’g v. Satyam Comp. Services Ltd., (2008) 4 S.C.C. 190 (India).
Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Serv. Inc., Civil Appeal
No.7019 of 2005 available at http://www.sci.nic.in/outtoday/ac701905p.pdf.
17
See Karan S. Tyagi, A Second Look at International Arbitration, The Hindu (Dec.
11, 2011), http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article2735659.ece?homepage=true
(last visited on 01/02/2013).
18
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art.
5, 10 June 1958, 330 U.N.T.S 4739.
19
Umer Akram Choudhary, Marking their Territory: Bharat Aluminum v.
Kaiser Aluminum Technical Services, Wolters Kluwer (Sep. 13, 2012), http://
kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2012/09/13/marking-their-territory-bharataluminum-v-kaiser-aluminum-technical-services-2012/.
15
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extended to foreign arbitrations as well. The relevant question was
whether the omission expresses the intention of the Indian Parliament
to widen the applicability of Part I of the Act to arbitrations outside
India. Rejecting this proposition, the Court held the omission of “only”
in Section 2(2) of the Act does not indicate that Indian courts could
supervise arbitration proceedings taking place outside India. Rather,
the Court determined that the Act adopted a scheme different from the
Model Law in this respect. In Article 1(2) of the Model Law, it was
necessary to include the word “only” to clarify that, except for certain
provisions, the Model Law would be applicable on strictly territorial
basis. The exceptions stipulated in Article 1(2) of the Model Law were
not enumerated in Section 2(2) of the Act, and therefore, the word
“only” would have been superfluous there.20
B. The Center of Gravity of Arbitral Process and the Seat
Theory
A critical issue in any international arbitration is the location of
the arbitral seat and the territoriality thesis. A major part of the judgment deals with the territoriality principle that forms the conceptual
basis for Article 1(2) of the Model Law. Accordingly, the territoriality
principle holds that the Model Law would only apply where the place
of arbitration was in the contracting State. In most legal systems, the
arbitration law of a state is territorial in scope, regulating arbitration
proceedings that have their seat within the territory of that state and
not the foreign arbitrations. In the Court’s decision in BALCO, the
Court affirmed that the Act adopted the territoriality principle of the
Model Law, which is abundantly clear from the scheme of the Act.21 The
application of Part I is, therefore, restricted to arbitrations taking place
in India. To quote from the Preamble of the Act itself, “[t]he seat of
arbitration is intended to be the central point or its center of gravity.”22
Recognizing this principle to be applicable in the Indian context as well,
the Court in BALCO endorsed one of the most fundamental concepts of
international arbitration law.
On the other hand, the delocalization debate has certainly influenced
and fuelled a movement away from the control of the domestic courts
See Tyagi, supra note 17.
See The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, Preamble, No. 26 of 1996, India Code.
22
See Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial
Arbitration (Sweet & Maxwell eds., 4th ed. 2004).
20
21

62

THE ARBITRATION BRIEF

Volume 3

at the place of arbitration.23 This form of delocalized arbitration can
be practiced only if the state and its laws permit it. Here, the Court
clearly identified the fact that Indian law does not recognize delocalized
arbitration proceedings. If the parties have not selected the law governing the conduct of arbitration, the law of the seat of arbitration governs
the arbitration proceedings as it is “most closely connected with the
proceedings.”24 Therefore, by agreeing to a seat or place of arbitration
outside of India, the parties choose the laws of the seat of arbitration to
govern the conduct of arbitrations. This is an issue of party autonomy
and the Act allows parties to opt out of it by choosing the seat of arbitration in another country.
C. Enforcement and Annulment
The delocalized view separates the existence of award from the
law of the country of origin or place of arbitration, by challenging the
premise that any legal activity occuring within the territory is governed
by the law of that country. However, the NY Convention tries to strike
a balance between these two views by putting Article V(1)(e) in the
text.25 The Indian Parliament has adopted this provision in the form of
Section 48(1)(e). The Supreme Court in BALCO correctly identified
the ambiguity existing in this provision and held that the correct
interpretation of Article V(1)(e) of the NY Convention is that an award
can be challenged in “the country, under the law of which the award
was made” only if the annulment action in “the country in which the
award was made” is not available. The Court further specified that the
terms “under the law” in Article V(1)(e) refer to the procedural law of
arbitration proceedings rather than the substantive law of arbitration.26
Therefore, an annulment action could only be brought in the country
“under the law of which the award was made” in the rare situation where
See Otto Sandrock, To Continue Nationalizing or to De-Nationalize? That is Now
the Question in International Arbitration, 12 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 301 (2001).
24
See Bharat Aluminum Co., Civil Appeal No. 7019 of 2005, ¶ 105 (citing Albert
Dicey and John Morris, The Conflict of Laws (Stevens & Sons eds. 11th ed. 1987));
also see supra note 9.
25
Article V 1(e) says that enforcement of a New York Convention award can be
refused where it “has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the
country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.”
26
See Bharat Aluminum Co., Civil Appeal No. 7019 of 2005, ¶ 153 (citing Int’l
Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Indus. Y Comercial, 745
F. Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
23
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parties have agreed upon a procedural law other than that of the arbitral
seat.27
Conclusion
The BALCO judgment, undoubtedly, is a restatement of international commercial arbitration law as envisaged under the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act of 1996. This well-researched decision brought in
conceptual clarity and straightened out certain contentious issues that
existed for a long time, by declaring that Part I and Part II of the Act
are mutually exclusive. However, there are still certain issues that need
to be clarified because the Indian Supreme Court took a ‘hands-off ’
approach by declining to “fill up the void” that existed in the arbitration
regime.
I. Interim Measures
The Supreme Court categorically declared that Part I of the Act cannot be applied in an arbitration seated abroad. Thus, no party can make
an application to a court in India for interim measures of protection
under Section 9 of the Act (which comes under Part I). This decision
puts the parties in a more dangerous situation than the Bhatia regime,
where they had the freedom of opting out of all or some of the provisions
of Part I. Read in the context of interim measures, the Bhatia rationale
retained the freedom of the parties to approach the Indian courts under
Section 9, unless it is excluded. Hence, the parties are now left remediless, as far as the interim relief is concerned, if the choice of seat is in
a foreign country. Nevertheless, this verdict may prove to be a positive
step as far as India’s dream to become a hub of international arbitration,
because it is now mandatory to select an Indian seat to obtain an interim
remedy from the court.
II. Prospective Overruling
Though the judgment has generally been received positively by
the international arbitration community, there remains some reservations particularly with respect to the prospective overruling element of
the decision. The concern arises from the fact that this decision will
apply only to arbitration agreements which are concluded on or after
Id. at ¶ 149 (citing Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration, Chapter 21,
(Kluwer Law International eds. 3d ed. 2009).
27
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September 6, 2012.28 The logical implication is that the courts in India
still have the option of exercising their long arm jurisdiction to offshore
arbitrations, with respect to arbitration agreements executed prior to
this date. Given the existence of litigations pending in various Indian
courts, this is likely to become a contentious issue in the near future as it
envisages the creation of two parallel regimes. There will be anomalous
situations when courts supervising arbitrations decide the matter either
according to Bhatia doctrine or BALCO rationale depending on the date
of formation of the arbitration agreement. However, the court’s decision
to apply the BALCO rationale only prospectively, can also be seen as an
effort to balance the interests of the parties and avoid the miscarriage
of justice by entirely washing away the possibility of an interim remedy.
Nevertheless, the arbitration enthusiasts will have to wait and see how
the Indian judges maintain these two parallel regimes in future.

28

Id. at ¶ 200.

